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Abstract
The use of metaphors in a computerized setting is not without its problems. Far from
being a simple ‘tool’, in the ordinary sense, the computer has a built-in propensity for
‘capturing’ both its maker and its users. One could say that by its very structure, it
defies the boundaries set for normal human activity: speed, memory, (co-) presence,
interacting, steering, producing, and so on. If we talk about the computer as a ‘pros-
thesis’ (one of the most recent metaphors that have been suggested), such talk too,
implies a certain attitude towards the prosthetic ‘tool’ The present article examines the
various aspects of this particular metaphor and discusses its pros and cons, also with a
view towards the newly emerging sub-discipline of Cognitive Technology, CT.
1. Introduction. The use of metaphors in computing
Like every other human activity, the use of computers, too, has generat-
ed its own set of metaphors. We do our word processing using a
‘mouse’, we ‘scroll’ files up and down, we ‘chase’ information on the
internet , we get ‘lost’ in cyberspace, or entrapped in the ‘mazes’ of the
‘web’, and even if we have no idea what we are doing there, we can al-
ways call it ‘surfing’—sort of hanging out on the computerized corners
of our ‘cyber-hood’.1
Among the various metaphors that have been current to characterize
the computer and its use by humans, that of the ‘tool’ has been one of
the most pervasive. Just like tools help us execute certain activities
better and faster, so the computer has been considered a tool for per-
forming certain operations (such as bookkeeping, accounting, tallying,
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1 Actually, I just created what I think is a novel computer metaphor: computational
space as a (neighbor)-‘hood’.
registering, archiving, and so on) in a better and more efficient, and
especially faster way. Among the attributes of this tool that have
attracted most attention are, naturally, the ease with which it ‘falls into’
the human hand and routine; by extension, the computer is not even
thought of as a tool any longer: enter the invisible, or ‘transparent’ tool
(as I have called it; Mey 1988), to be preferred over other, more visible
and obtrusive kinds of instruments.
Before I go on to discuss the specific metaphor that is the subject of
the present contribution, viz., the computer as prosthesis, a few general
reflections on the computer’s ‘toolness’ are in order.
2. Tool and user
In a non-sophisticated way of speaking and thinking, a tool is a device
that humans use in order to make their lives easier, more pleasurable,
and more manageable. The early tools of Primitive Man (such as flint
knives and fire drills) were tools for survival; in our days, the tools that
we surround us with are designed to help us achieve our goals more
efficiently and in ways that we would not have dreamt of earlier. As an
instance, consider locomotion and its tools. From the pedes apostolo-
rum to the Concorde or the solid fuel driven rocket, there is a gap not
only of time, but also of order. 
The notion of flying humans, as conceived by Icarus, Leonardo, or
Jules Verne is toto caelo different from the actual thing and its associat-
ed mental and real attributes and concepts. Earlier, flying was consider-
ed a way of proving to the gods that we, too, can ‘defy space’, ‘with
wings not destined for humans’ (exper[iri] vacuum ... pennis non
homini datis; Horace, Odes I,iii:34-35), and that there are no limits for
the human species wanting to ‘rush into forbidden territory’ (gens hu-
mana ruit per vetitum nefas; Horace, ibid.:26). In our days, flying has
become more of a way of getting to a place in less time, with the places
staying in the same location, physically speaking, but their psycholog-
ical distances from us becoming less and less of a constant, mental real-
ity. On the contrary: in our days, the more miles we cover and the faster
we go, the more the distance to the objects of our locomotion becomes
fictitious, a mental un-reality. And this is the ultimate paradox, the real
‘fear of flying’: What if the sky itself is ‘the limit for our stupidity’?
(caelum ipsum petimus stultitia; Horace, ibid.:39)
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This, admittedly somewhat facile, observation conceals a deeper
truth than would be immediately visible. Just as the shrinking distance
to the object of our travels changes that goal in our minds, so the quality
of our aims, when realized with computerized help, changes, so to
speak, before our very eyes, on the very screen that we’re watching.
When our mind ‘clicks’ on a problem solving program, just like our
computer mouse clicks on a computer search scenario, we are under the
impression that we’ve not only solved, but also understood, the prob-
lem. While an ‘understanding’ solution may have been our original and
deeper aim, we have been re-programmed to consider, and accept, a
purely factual solution, all under the guidance, and in the spirit of, our
computerized routines that tell us to ask ‘how to’, but not ‘why’.
To see this more clearly, consider the following parallel from the area
of manual labor. Elsewhere (Mey 1996), I have discussed, using a very
simple example, how the technology we use serves to change the ob-
jects targeted by those techniques—not just before our eyes, but within
our very minds. Here is the example: A modern invention, the leaf-
blower, now a household item in most gardening environments, has en-
tirely changed our mental perceptions of the proper goals of gardening
and of the proper means to attain those goals. What earlier was done
centripetally, so to speak, using a rake to gather the leaves on the
ground, then transferring them with the help of a shovel or a dust-pan
into a refuse bag or barrel, is now done by moving the leaves and other
garden detritus centrifugally, away from us, ‘with no particular place to
go’. 
Moreover, our aim: cleaning the lawn or the garden path or the patio,
has hereby itself become redefined, and the standards for ‘successful
lawn cleaning’ have changed from a  normal level of ‘leaflessness’ to a
level of perfection only to be matched by the vacuumed domestic car-
pet. In addition, any secondary aim (for example, of gathering the leaves
in our yard for the purpose of composting) has been mostly abolished,
being now subordinated to the new, re(de)fined primary aim of getting
the leaves, all of the leaves, and nothing but the leaves, out of one’s
way. (Actually, adding: ‘nothing but the leaves’ here is a bit of a mis-
nomer, since the leaf-blower removes also most of the other compo-
nents of the vegetal and animal, not to mention mineral, material that
makes up our garden environment). 
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The thrust of his analogy is that the leaf-blower, being a tool, does
more than help us realize our aims. In the process of helping us, it
changes those aims, and makes us more dependent on the tool in order
to realize the changed, ‘tool-adapted’ aims. Thus, it is simply not the
case that the use of a tool (such as the computer) only changes the task,
not the performer, as advocated by Norman, who talks about merely
‘bridging’ what he calls the ‘gulfs’ of evaluation and of execution, with
the aid of computerized tools (1986). In actual fact, computers do make
the user smarter (cf. the title of a later book by Norman: Things that
make us smart; 1993); the risk is that this ‘smartness’, some way down
the road, may not be all that smart, or maybe not even smart at all. To
see this, consider now the computer metaphor of the prosthesis.
3. The computer as prosthesis
The notion of considering computers as prosthetic devices is not new.
In a thoughtful recent article, Richard Janney remarks the following:
“The idea of computers as mental prostheses was implicit fifteen years
ago in an article published in the Journal of Pragmatics, in which Tre-
vor Pateman (1982:237) argued that ‘computer programs are things to
think with, not things which think ... this is their virtue’. 
In the same issue of the Journal, Jacob Mey (1982:212) emphasi-
zed the need for developing artificial intelligence technology that
works for us, in our service, helping us to perform our tasks, and not
simply technology designed to meet its own needs or intended to repli-
cate, compete with, or replace human thought. These were the begin-
nings of the view, which is now an underlying assumption of Cogniti-
ve Technology, that computers can be regarded as prosthetically
extending the capacities of the human mind”. (Janney 1999:71)
A prosthesis is usually understood as a mechanical device that func-
tions as a (pseudo-) replacement or an extension of a human body part.
For instance, prostheses like an artificial leg or a crutch do not really
‘replace’ a missing leg; they merely help the body in maintaining some
of the functions that the vanished leg used to have (keeping balance,
practice locomotion, etc.). In other cases, existing body parts are given
an extension or redefinition so that they can function as aids to, or re-
place missing functions of, other body parts. Ontogenetically, this hap-
pens all the time: our present inner ear is a redefined body part from the
time we used to swim around as fish (stirrup, hammer, and anvil are
parts of a primitive maxilla still found in gadus, the common cod). With
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the help of modern technology, the mouth or the feet can be trained to
handle paint brushes in the case of para- or quadriplegics, persons who
have been (almost) totally paralyzed, and thus allow them to exercise
their human and artistic functions, keeping themselves not only busy,
but simply alive.
Consider now a case such as the following. In William Gibson’s cult
novel Neuromancer (1995; originally 1984, hence an ‘oldie’ as far as
sci-fi goes, and by now a classic of its genre), the female protagonist is
a woman by the name of Molly. Among other things, she excels in
computerized implants: her fingers have sprouted motorized ten-inch
long razor blades attached under the nails, and her eyes have been ‘aug-
mented’ by inset lenses which not only enhance her vision, but in addi-
tion, are wired up as small computer systems, connected to a distant
mainframe. Among the more mundane features of this system is a time
read-out in digital; on a more sophisticated level, the lenses also give a
‘wired’ partner the possibility to share the visual and other sensations
that Molly experiences, via a computer technology known as ‘simstim’
(for ‘simulated stimulation’). Here is how Gibson describes some of the
system’s less technical details, as seen by the male protagonist, Case, on
their first encounter:
“She wore mirrored glasses. ... He realized that the glasses were sur-
gicaly inset, sealing her sockets. The silver lenses seemed to grow
from smooth pale skin above her cheekbones, ... “ (1995:36)
Later in the book, Molly is scanned for possible other implants by a
shady technician-technodealer called Finn, who comments on his find-
ings as follows:
“Something new in your head, yeah. silicon, coat of pyrolitic carbons.
A clock, right? Your glasses gimme the read they always have, low-
temp isotropic carbons. Better biocompatibility with pyrolitics, but
that’s your business, right? Same with your claws.” (Gibson 1995:64;
the last remark refers to Molly’s ‘amplified’ fingers).
And here is Case’s own description of what he experiences when he
enters Molly’s ‘sensorium’ in simstim:
“The abrupt jolt into other flesh. ... he willed himself into passivity,
became the passenger behind her eyes.
The glasses didn’t seem to cut down the sunlight at all. He wonder-
ed if the built-in amps compensated automatically. Blue alphanumer-
ics winked the time low in her left peripheral field. Showing off, he
thought.” (Gibson 1995:72)
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When we read a story such as Neuromancer, deep down we know, of
course, that this is just fiction, and that it really doesn’t have to bother
us. But fiction is always more than fiction. Being a figment of the
author’s imagination,  it is a fictive, ‘shaped’ nature; but at the same
time, it is a ‘shaping nature’, a fiction that creates us, the readers, as part
of the fiction. Neuromancer has taught us to ‘see’ things with eyes like
Molly’s, to move around the city like Case, or like another ‘Bladerun-
ner’, witness those Japanese who introduced Gibson (in real life) to the
vast commercial and shopping district of Shibuya in Tokyo, in what is
described as the overwhelming sensation of a 
“first nighttime view, ... mazed by highrises cascading with vast tele-
vision images ... 
[O]ne of my two black-raincoated Japanese guides gestured up at all
of this and said, in explanation, ‘Bladerunner town, like Neuroman-
cer.’” (Gibson 1995:320). 
In the next section, I will examine the circumstances of this ‘fictionaliz-
ing’, and ask the question in what sense, and to what extent, it will
change, or maybe has already changed, not only our understanding of
ourselves as cognitive beings, but our cognitive faculties as well.
4. Task and artifact
It has been well known, ever since the pioneering work of people like
Carroll (1991) that the tool we use to perform a particular task not only
assists us in doing what we have to do, but also changes our understand-
ing of the task itself and of a host of other things related to the task; in
the end, it may change the very nature of the task altogether. 
Consider again the case of the leaf-blower, discussed above, in Sec-
tion 2. Our experience of cleaning the lawn, and our understanding of
our duties in keeping the lawn leaf-less, have changed as a result of our
using this particular tool. Similarly, it has been said that the vacuum
cleaner, originally introduced to alleviate  and lessen our housekeepers’
boring chores, in the end has made them work even more, and made
their work even more boring, because now it had to be performed more
often, and to a greater degree of perfection. The artifact changes the
task, and vice versa, in a never ending cycle (or maybe better, a ‘spiral’,
as Salomon has suggested to call it; 1993).
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4.1. The prosthesis and its consequences
In the context of our discussion, the computer as a prosthesis, this has
some profound effects. A simple and simple-minded way of viewing a
prosthesis is to say that it represents an augmentation of a human capa-
bility (either in the sense of a replacing a lost faculty or of extending an
already existing one). But if we scratch this seemingly innocent surface,
a host of hidden assumptions and unexpected problems turn up. First,
there is the question of the augmentation itself: how far should we go,
or be allowed to go, in the enhancing of the human sensory faculties? In
the example of ‘simstim’, mentioned in the previous section, the ques-
tion of ethics should be brought up: Can one legally enter a person’s
‘sensorium’, partake in his or her sensations and feelings of all kinds?
We are all familiar with the problem from tabloid journalism: when it
comes to media coverage of events, very few people would question the
legality of photojournalism, but when people are confronted with an
event such as Princess Diana’s death, everybody instantly wants to dis-
tance themselves from the paparazzi and their activities. ‘They are go-
ing too far’, we hear people say. But what exactly is ‘too far’, and how
do we know?
4.2. The prosthesis: Good or bad?
Another problem that lurks in the remote caves of our subconscious is
the question of good and evil. Knowledge gives us power, but the tree
of knowledge was not particularly helpful in signposting our first pa-
rents towards a brighter future. Given that their instantly acquired, post-
apple mortality is usually construed as a punishment for their original
sin, we could even say that not only is knowledge not always useful, but
it may be outright dangerous. Too much knowledge kills, as the case of
Adam and Eve amply illustrates, even ‘unto this last’; similarly, an
overload of information is not conducive to proper linguistic cooper-
ation, as we all have come to realize ever since Paul Grice set down his
conversational maxims. 
4.3. On naturalness
Be that as it may, we are not exactly prepared to shut down our ma-
chines in the name of a return to basics, a kind of information-age Lud-
dyism. We will have to live with the computer, even if its perceived role
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as a prosthesis carries with it some serious problems. A parallel comes
to mind: suppose we consider the car under the angle of a prosthetic de-
vice, then we can easily see how the device both has helped us to ‘con-
quer distances’, and at the same time reduced our ability to cope with
distance in a natural way. When people do not wish to leave their cars,
even to satisfy such elementary human needs as food and drink, we
simply have become too dependent on our prostheses. In America, at
the drive-through liquor store or the McDonald’s, you don’t even have
to get out of your car to buy beer or a hamburger. In other parts of our
globe (to stay with the subject of human needs), a new problem has
arisen for those servicing and upkeeping the highways. Bags of fae-
calia, discarded from passing automobiles, pose serious personal, medi-
cal, and even mechanical hazards to the unfortunate workers who are
mowing the grass along the highway and inadvertently hit a bag of
human excrements. 
4.4. Primary and secondary effects
As is well known, and has been remarked on by a number of research-
ers, the secondary effects of technological innovations are usually
much more far-reaching than was intended by the original inventors.
Henry Ford wanted to put an automobile in everybody’s driveway, and
look what we’ve got: highways extending into everybody’s backyard!
As for the automobile itself, it is much more than a transportation de-
vice; it figures in our minds as the premier status symbol, our ‘escape
on wheels’, for some even serving as an extra bedroom. As we see, the
innovation changes that which it was supposed to innovate: the prosthe-
tic tail wags the human dog.
4.5. Augmenting what?
Another problem with the prosthetic augmentation metaphor, when ap-
plied to the computer, is that the notion of augmenting a human  faculty
presupposes the existence of something which is not augmented, or
‘natural’. In this sense, applying a prosthesis to a human is akin to the
techniques of putting air brakes in your car, or adding a spoiler. What
these prostheses do is to enhance the brake function that was originally
there, or to improve the stability of the car at high speed. 
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The trouble with humans, however, is that they cannot behave ‘na-
turally’: while we do have certain ‘innate’ functions, these cannot pro-
perly be put to work unless we initiate them, break them in, socially and
culturally. And when it comes to enhancing a particular human, cultur-
ally-bound and socially-developed function, it remains an open ques-
tion if we can do that without taking the other parts of the human profile
into account. 
Computerized functions, such as the use of a word processor, may
facilitate the ways in which we produce texts; on the other hand, the
texts we produce may be radically different from those that originated
in a non-computerized environment. Here, I’m not talking about the
outer appearances of a document (by which a draft may look like a final
version of an article, and be judged on that count), but rather, about the
ways we practice formulating our ideas. 
For instance, if we know that what we write may be disseminated
across an international network, or abstracted in a database that is used
by people from different walks of life and contrasting ethnic and cul-
tural backgrounds, we will try to express ourselves in some kind of
‘basic conceptualese’, shunning the use of metaphors and idiomatic ex-
pressions, thus sacrificing style to retrievability of information. As
Kelly Wical has observed, automated indexing of documents
“will encourage people to write plainly, without metaphors ... that might confuse
search engines. After all, everyone wants people to find what they have written”. (Wical
1996; quoted in Marsh et al. 1999:105)
4.6. The fragmented body
The tool-originated metaphor of the computer as a prosthesis carries
with it yet another drawback. Since prostheses typically target one par-
ticular human capacity for augmentation, we come to think of our capa-
cities as individually ‘enhanceable’. There are two aspects to this en-
hancing: one, we consider only the individual agent, without taking his
or her larger societal context into account, and two, we enhance single
faculties in the individual, without taking into account the fact that
these capacities form a unit, a human whole. 
As to the first aspect, the societal character of our capacities, con-
sider the paradox that Kaptelinin and Kuutti draw attention to: the very
fact that, say, a decision making computer tool may have proven suc-
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cessful in the United States, may warn us against trying to introduce it
into a Japanese surrounding, where decisions among humans are made
in rather different ways than is done in the US (Kaptelinen & Kuutti
1999:152).
The other aspect relates to a currently popular notion of human capa-
cities as being ‘modularly replaceable’. Just as we are seeing the begin-
ning of ‘surgical engineering’, in which techniques of replacement have
substituted for old-fashioned operation and healing procedures, so we
are witness to a trend toward substituting and augmenting not only parts
of the body itself (such as is done in heart or kidney transplantation),
but entire mental functions. A reasoning chip implanted in our brain
relieves us from the headaches of going through the motions of filling
in the trivial parts of a mathematical proof, or a chain of syllogisms. A
memory chip may replace a person’s worn-out or Alzheimer-affected
remembering capacities. In general, wetware can be replaced by more
sturdy and robust electronic hardware, pre-wired to augment specific
mental functions, and even tooled precisely to fit the needs of a parti-
cular individual. The potential for prosthetic innovations of this kind is
virtually unlimited, up to the point where the whole person may end up
being ‘re-tooled’ electronically.
4.7. Mind and body
Conceiving of the computer as a prosthesis thus seems to lead us to the
final resolution of that ancient dichotomy: the mind-body split. If any-
thing in the mind can be reproduced on a computer, then we don’t need
the body at all. Or, vice versa, if the computerized body can take over
all our mental functions, why then do we have to deal with a mind?
There are indeed tendencies afoot that seem to advocate this kind of
thinking. A recent book by Andy Clark proudly announces, in its sub-
title, the ability to ‘put brain, body, and world together again’ (1997,
frontispiece). However, this synthesis is performed strictly on the basis
of a computer-as-prosthesis informed philosophy: one describes the
mental functions as modules (if need be, computerized) to be united
under a common ordering principle, or joined loosely in some kind of
mental republic, a ‘society of mind’ à la Minsky (1986). All the time the
emphasis is on the brain, not the mind, the latter being characterized as
a “grab-bag of inner agencies”, while the “central executive in the brain
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— the real boss who organizes and integrates the activities” is said to be
“gone”. Also “[g]one is the neat boundary between the thinker (the bo-
diless intellectual engine), and the thinker’s world”. No wonder, then,
that replacing this “comfortable image” puts us in front of a number of
“puzzling (dare I say metaphysical?) questions” (Clark 1997:220-221).
In a final section, I will examine these questions, and the claims they
imply, in the light of the ‘prosthesis’ metaphor; I will also try to draw
some conclusions.
5. Conclusion: Mind or brain? The ecological prosthesis
In the preceding discussion (which is typically found not only in
Clark’s book, but also in the literature elsewhere), the emphasis is on
the brain, as opposed to the mind. If the latter is introduced at all, it is
only in a parenthetical (not to say prosthetic) function, as in the quote at
the end of the previous section. Note also that the word ‘mind’ does not
even occur in the subtitle of Clark’s book: “Putting brain, body, and
world together again”). What (if anything) does this (willful?) omission
imply?
We started out talking about the computer as a metaphorical substi-
tute for, or aid to, the human’s cognitive abilities: a mental prosthesis.
Prostheses are thought of as material instruments, designed to  imple-
ment a certain function, associated with a particular part of the body. As
to the brain, it can be thought of as a highly specialized body part, en-
dowed with capabilities to execute functions that, while still embodied,
are only remotely similar to the simple functions that can be supported
or emulated by prosthetic devices such as artificial arms or legs. 
As a next step, while considering the complexities of modern com-
puters and computer programs, and despite being impressed by their
ability to perform the most intricate functions, earlier thought to be the
unique domain of the human (as in artificial intelligence or expert sys-
tems), we have started speculating about these functions’ similarities
with the functions that a human performs. This applies not only to the
execution of simple mental operations, such as adding, subtracting, and
so on, but also to the more complex functions of perceiving, thinking,
comparing, deciding, and even feeling. Pursuing this line of thought,
we may end up considering the computer program as the most suitable
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model of brain activity, and the computer as some kind of metaphorical,
prosthetic brain.
There are two kinds of dangers inherent in this modeling. First, we
may be tempted to reverse the direction of the metaphor: rather than
thinking of the computer as a metaphorical prosthesis for the mind, we
may conceive of our minds as prostheses for some outside agency, a
central computer that keeps us all in place via an intricate system of
wiring. After all, when a popular journal of computer gossip-cum-
technology calls itself Wired, the implication is that one considers one-
self as ‘connected’, just like the protagonist in Neuromancer had him-
self wired into the sensorium of another agent by means of ‘simstim’
(see Section 3, above). 
I will readily admit that the vision depicted in Section 3 is a mildly
futuristic one. For a contemporary approximation, one can consider the
way most people are ‘wired’ into the mass media of communication:
their lives and thoughts are dictated by the media, and if one doesn’t
plug into this immense network of information and entertainment, one
is ‘out’, in the strictest sense of the word: outside of the talk of the day
at the workplace, outside of the discussions in the press, outside of the
newscasts and the television reports on current scandals and shootings;
in other words, the non-wired’ person is the typical outsider. 
The insider, on the other hand, does not (and cannot) realize to what
extent the simple presence of thought and feelings, otherwise consider-
ed as ‘naturally’ arising within the mind, is due to this connection, this
‘wiredness’. It takes a ‘black screen’ (or another temporal media depri-
vation) to fathom the depths of one’s dependency, the extent of one’s
being ‘hooked’ (itself a near-synonym of, or even a metaphor for, ‘wir-
ed’) up to or into the ‘infotainment’ universe of our days. For all prac-
tical purposes, one could replace the media outlets by some central in-
stance, have this wired directly into people’s heads, and bingo, we’re in
business: the wired society becomes a frightening reality, with Big Bro-
ther embodied in a central monster computer, controlling and directing
our entire lives.
The other danger is more subtle, and not as sci-fi inspired as the first
one, and for that reason all the more real. It has to do with the nature of
the mental prosthesis that the computer represents. The computer’s spe-
cial features (programs and functions that are distributed throughout the
hardware rather than being encapsulated in neat, identifiable blocks of
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instructions, routines being divided into subroutines to be used inde-
pendently and/or recursively, and so on) have led us to think of the brain
as a similarly organized, distributed architecture. The connectionist
view of mental processing is based on this analogy, and the prosthesis
metaphor, if applied within this frame of thinking, transforms the indi-
vidual mental features and functions into a set of independent, yet con-
nected components (a ‘grab bag of inner agencies’, as Clark irreverent-
ly calls it; 1997:221). The question is, and the problem remains, how to
orchestrate all those brainy agencies into some kind of mental unit. 
Let’s for a moment return to the original idea of a prosthesis. What
does the artificial leg essentially represent? Not so much a leg, as it does
a function: that of human locomotion. Similarly, Molly’s mirrored eyes
in Neuromancer embody, in addition to vision proper (the domain of the
eyes) a couple of ‘extra-visual’ functions, belonging to other domains
(mostly those of information processing and -storing), that somehow
could be incorporated into the prosthesis without causing too much
trouble or discomfort to the user.
The key word here is embodied. In a sense, all prostheses are embo-
died, since they are part of, or attached to, some body. In the particular
case of the computer prosthesis, the metaphor acquires a new dimen-
sion, based on the distributed architecture that is considered to be char-
acteristic both of the brain and of the computer itself. Such a distri-
bution can only be successful if it is embodied, not only in the person
using the prosthesis, but also in the world surrounding him or her. An
artificial hand must respect the needs of the prosthesis wearer not only
to be able to exercise certain functions, but in addition, must do so in an
environmentally acceptable way. The artificial limb has to be made part
of the environment in order to work properly; this includes, just as in
the case of the transparent or invisible tool that I discussed in Section 1,
the capability of blending in with the environment: the ‘natural’ arti-
ficial hand or leg, as opposed to the pirate captain’s hook or Long John
Silver’s wooden stump.
However, this ecological embodiment of the mental prosthesis has a
deeper level of significance. And so has its distribution. The psychol-
ogist James J. Gibson (1979) has created the concept of ‘affordance’, by
which he meant to capture the fact that our sensory knowledge to a
certain degree is incorporated in, ‘afforded by’, the objects of percep-
tion surrounding us. Not in the sense of the post-Kantian idealistic
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philosophers, who thought that the external object was a pure creation
of the internal spirit, but rather akin to the original sense that Kant en-
visaged, when he proclaimed that the ‘categories without object are
empty’. What we see, depends on what we see; seeing is not just some-
thing in the eyes of the beholder, but exists, pre-formed as it were, in the
objects of his or her seeing. The way objects are adapted to our vision,
and the way we can perceive them as such, together make up the con-
cept of affordance: we see what we can afford to see, in the strict sense
of the term. 
The danger that I identified earlier in this section, namely of locating
the individual features of the mind as prosthesis-like attachments to
some central brainy hardware, can be obviated by placing those ‘com-
puter-like’ functions in their proper environment, by embodying them
in the sense of Gibson’s affordances. Our eyes see that which they can
afford to see, based on their visual capabilities and on the way these
capabilities are placed in their proper environment. In the same way, we
think what the brain allows us to think,  but on condition that the brain’s
functions are embodied in some informed mental hardware, the ‘brainy
prosthesis’. The mind is where the brain meets the environment, and
receives its affordances. The mind is the embodied brain.
When using a metaphor such as that of the ‘computer-as-prosthesis’,
we should therefore be careful to keep in mind that to focus on the
hardware aspects of the prosthesis alone would be just as wrong as to
uniquely define and describe the functions of the prosthesis in terms of
‘what it can do’. That question should be expanded to comprise also
such elements as the users and the environment. Hence, we should ask
not just what the computer can do as a prosthesis, as a help in our lives,
but what it does to our lives and to ourselves, as well as to our environ-
ment. 
Conversely, in evaluating the success of a particular prosthetic prog-
ram or device, we should inquire how well it fits in with both the user’s
needs and the environment’s affordances. Just as in the old debates
about ‘innate’ vs. ‘acquired’ capabilities, we must stress again that the
development and fit of a prosthesis is defined not only by what it
functions as, but by how it does that, and can do that, in a particular en-
vironment. Innateness is worthless without an affordance; human facul-
ties are meaningless without the acquired culture that will support
them, witness the celebrated cases of the enfants sauvages. 
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Here in particular, the case of language offers an egregious example.
Despite the efforts on the part of the Chomskyites and their fellow-trav-
elers to restrict the workings of human language acquisition to an ab-
stract mechanism called LAD (‘language acquisition device’—a failed
prosthesis metaphor, if ever there was any—), language acquisition can
only proceed successfully in the ecological, affordable environment of
a community of users. The ‘acquisition device’, if there is any such
thing, should be thought of as being ‘distributed’ ecologically, just like
an affordance, among users and environments; the same thinking
should be brought to bear on the metaphor of the computer as a pros-
thesis.
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